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VIEWPOINT 
Against All Odds: A Legacy of Appropriation, 
Contestation, and Negotiation of Arab Feminisms 
in Postcolonial States1 
Hoda Elsadda, Cairo University 
Abstract: Arab feminists have always faced challenges related to the burden of colonialism, 
accusations of westernization, isolation from their cultural heritage, and elitism, but the biggest 
challenge of all has been the fact that their activism and their entire lives have all been in the context 
of authoritarian postcolonial states. This article engages with a persistent challenge to Arab feminists 
that questions their impact, their awareness of their cultural and societal problems, and undermines 
their achievements over the years. It constructs a narrative of what feminists have achieved against all 
odds, within the constraints of authoritarian postcolonial states that have politically manipulated and 
appropriated women’s rights issues. It sheds light on how Arab feminists contested power, negotiated 
with power, won and lost battles, but have persisted and still do. A survey of key trends in Arab 
feminisms is attempted, with a focus on Egypt and brief references to Arab countries. 
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Introduction 
 
For the last few years, since the tumultuous wave of revolutions that shook the Arab world in 2011, 
and the direct and oftentimes violent confrontations with state structures, I have been very 
preoccupied with the question of how feminists negotiate power, or, how Arab feminists have 
managed their relation with modern postcolonial nation states. The opening up of political spaces 
brought about by large scale protests and activism enabled revisionist analytical rethinking of 
positions, self criticism, and much soul searching by feminists and other social and political activists 
about the impact, or lack, of years and years of activism and oppositional politics. Younger women, 
empowered by the revolutionary possibilities in the air and feeling confident in their power to effect 
change, questioned the effectiveness and value of feminist movements. Additionally, feminists with a 
history of activism disagreed on whether women’s activism in Egypt could be described as a 
movement. These and many other related discussions foregrounded one key issue: that many of the 
critical appraisals of women’s movements in Egypt and the Arab world do not take into consideration 
the realities and processes of power; rather, they focus on the end result such as the success or failure 
of women obtaining a specific right or demand.  
Arab feminists have always faced challenges related to the burden of colonialism, accusations 
of westernization, isolation from their cultural heritage, and elitism. However, the biggest challenge of 
all has been the fact that their activism and their entire lives have all been in the context of 
authoritarian postcolonial states. This point was brought home in the immediate aftermath of 
revolutions that, despite the violence and tragic consequences, had opened up political spaces for 
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oppositional activism and negotiation with state bodies and restored confidence in people’s agency 
and ability to effect change. In the context of relative political liberalization, feminists were at the 
forefront of political movements for change. If we acknowledge the obvious facts that 
authoritarianism is not good for any body, especially women, dictatorships by definition are inimical 
to social movements, and collective action or new ideas can potentially lead to change and shake the 
status quo or hegemonic power structures, then we might be able to assess and understand what Arab 
feminists have accomplished (or not) in a new light.  
This article engages with a persistent challenge to Arab feminists that questions their impact, 
their awareness of their cultural and societal problems, and undermines their achievements over the 
years. I construct a narrative of what feminists have achieved against all odds within the constraints of 
authoritarian postcolonial states that have politically manipulated and appropriated women’s rights 
issues. In other words, I will shed light on how Arab feminists contest power, negotiate power, win 
and lose battles, but have persisted and still do. I attempt a survey of key trends in Arab feminisms 
with a focus on Egypt and brief references to Arab countries. While there are important differences in 
context and processes between Arab countries, I argue that the Egyptian story is an Arab story with 
important variations, or at least a story that resonates with many Arab stories.  Importantly, this 
article is grounded in my research on women’s movements in the Arab world and beyond, as well as 
my experience as a feminist activist involved in the women’s movement in Egypt for more than three 
decades.  
 
 
Beginnings  
 
The emergence of the “woman question” in the Arab world began against the background of colonial 
domination and the initiation of the modernization project at the end of the nineteenth century and 
the first decades of the twentieth. Historians of the Arab world note how the “backward status of Arab 
women” was used by colonialists as a stick to beat Arab societies (Sayigh 1981) and how many early 
reformers internalized this colonial discourse putting the burden of Arab “backwardness” on the 
shoulders of women. Qasim Amin (1899) argued the backwardness of women in Egypt was an 
obstacle to progress and that improving their status, which meant liberating them from the burden of 
tradition and superstition, was a prerequisite for national independence from colonialism and for 
becoming a modern nation.  The link between women’s liberation, national liberation, and the 
modernization project has always been a double-edged sword. Bettering the status of women as a 
condition for modernization was behind Amin’s call for the education of women. At the same time, 
women in the Arab world were burdened with the impossible task of simultaneously being both the 
icons of tradition and the trail-blazers of modernity; or to use Najmabadi’s insightful phrase, to be 
“modern but modest” (1991, 49). It also meant that any discussion of women’s status in society 
inevitably became a discussion of something else: national identity; national independence; the 
relation with the west; the necessity or lack of safeguarding cultural specificity; how to emulate the 
western model of modernity while fighting western colonialism; and so forth. Needless to say, this 
symbolic dimension of the “woman question” complicated women’s liberation struggle. 
What did women do vis-a-vis the ambivalence in modernist discourse? What were the 
strategies that women resorted to? To begin, many women embraced modernist discourses about 
gender roles and division of labor, or what feminists have labeled domestic ideology. A glance at the 
magazine al-Fatah, the first women’s magazine published in 1892 and owned by a woman, Hind 
Nawfal, provides a fairly good overview of how women appropriated yet contested modernist 
discourses on gender. The magazine propagated the view that women were responsible for their own 
advancement and it was conditional on their becoming good managers of their households and their 
families.  Household duties are valorized and put on an equal footing with duties of political leaders or 
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managers of companies. In this sense, embracing domestic ideology becomes a strategy to ensure 
worth and status for women. At the same time, the magazine presented its readers with news and 
biographies of prominent women who have distinguished themselves in the public sphere, hence 
supporting their aspiration to acquire more roles outside their homes (Nawfal 1892). 
It is important to highlight that modernist discourses did not go unchallenged.  As an 
example, Malak Hifni Nasif’s was one of the voices to critique modernist discourses on gender of the 
nahda reformers. She refuted Amin’s call for the unveiling of women as a condition for their 
emancipation and argued instead for prioritizing access to education so women can make informed 
choices as regards their lives and bodies. She lambasted the nahda reformers for propagating a 
“pseudo nahda” and exposed the double standards that were implicit in their views and practices 
(Nasif 1910).  Also, the magazines and journals published in the last two decades of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries in Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon published numerous articles by women 
writers who argued for their right to education, employment, and participation in the public sphere. 
Women challenged misogynist ideas implicit and explicit in the discourses of some nahda reformers 
whose modernist views on gender roles were not always conducive to women’s quest for freedom and 
equality.2 
 
 
Women and National Independence 
 
Feminist movements in the Arab world were integral partners in national independence movements 
and struggles against colonialism. This partnership is acknowledged as a key feature of Arab women’s 
movements and one that is persistently highlighted in mainstream literature as to why some women’s 
movements gained legitimacy. In Egypt, women participated in the 1919 revolution against British 
colonialism. The sixteenth of March is celebrated as Egyptian Women’s Day, which marks the date of 
women martyrs shot by British soldiers during demonstrations in 1919. Women’s participation in the 
1919 revolution accorded value and legitimacy to the nascent women’s movement in Egypt.  
Empowered by their participation in the 1919 revolution, the Women Committee was formed 
in the Wafd party. The period from the 1920s to the early 50s is generally acknowledged as vibrant in 
the history of the women’s movement. The Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU) was founded in 1923. This 
union mainly consisted of members of the women’s committee in the Wafd who decided to establish 
an all women organization and depart from the Wafd party because the Wafd’s disregarded the 
opinions and demands of the women’s committee. The EFU played an important role in raising 
awareness, lobbying for the advancement of a women’s rights agenda, and mobilizing resources and 
public opinion to advocate for national independence. Members of the union assumed radical 
positions on national independence, democracy, and Arab solidarity. The EFU publically rejected the 
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, which did not resolve the issue of independence and the full 
withdrawal of British troops from Egypt. 
The participation of women in national liberation movements in Arab countries has been 
acknowledged and documented (Arenfeldt and Golley 2012).  Furthermore, Arab women’s rights 
activists agreed to give precedence to national independence over their demand for rights. The classic 
example is Algeria. In 1958, as a reaction to a call by French colonialists to Algerian women asking 
them to burn their veils in a public square and chant Algeria is French, Algerian women wore veils as a 
symbolic confirmation of their national identity and immersed themselves in the struggle for 
independence postponing their struggle for gender rights. However, the downside is women’s 
participation in national independence movements did not translate into an acknowledgement of 
their demands after independence in postcolonial nation states. In fact, and with reference again to 
the Algerian case, despite women’s huge sacrifices in the war of liberation, they were asked by their 
comrades to return to their homes. Bearing in mind significant variations between Arab countries, 
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women were not recognized as equal partners in the process of constructing modern nation states 
(ibid.). 
 
 
State Feminism in Postcolonial States 
 
State feminism in the Arab world usually has negative connotations and is generally seen as one of the 
obstacles that have impeded the formation of strong feminist movements. This is not universally true, 
as state feminism in Scandinavian countries, for example, denotes a reformist agenda adopted by the 
state to rectify gender inequality in state structures and mechanisms by enacting gender sensitive laws 
and increasing the number of women in public office. State feminism is regarded by many in a 
positive light, despite recent criticisms by feminists. Historically, state feminism in the Arab world is a 
phenomenon of the 1950s and 60s, which is the beginning of independent postcolonial states. 
However, state feminism in the Arab world brings to mind words like cooptation, appropriation and 
manipulation. Why?  
In an article on state feminism in Egypt, Mervat Hatem describes the role of state feminism in 
the 1950s and 60s as paradoxical (1992, 232).  On the one hand, much was achieved: the 1956 
constitution guaranteed equality before the law and no discrimination based on gender, race, 
language, religion, or belief and granted women political rights. Labor laws were modified to enable 
working women to perform their reproductive roles. On the other hand, the Personal Status Laws 
(PSL) were left intact, meaning that patriarchal domination of women in the private sphere was left 
unchallenged. This created a bizarre situation where women attained equality in the public sphere but 
were subject to the authority of male members of their families in the private sphere. The classic 
Egyptian story that captures this anomaly is the story of an Egyptian woman minister, member of the 
cabinet, who was traveling on official business but was detained at the airport because her husband 
decided to ban her from traveling. The second important problematic feature of state feminism in the 
Arab world is that it was supported by a postcolonial state that deliberately and effectively 
“demobilized Egyptian feminist organizations” (Hatem 1992, 233). Postcolonial Arab states, with 
variations but without exception, developed into authoritarian postcolonial states that clamped down 
on dissent and all forms of opposition movements, instituted one-party systems, and nationalized 
social movements.  
Again the classic Egyptian example of the tension between feminist organizations and the 
postcolonial state is the story of the Egyptian Feminist Union founded by Hoda Shaarawi in 1923. As 
mentioned earlier, this was an independent feminist organization, which advocated for a political and 
social agenda. In 1956, the EFU was dissolved by orders of the Revolutionary Council Leadership and 
replaced by the Association of Hoda Shaarawi, a charity organization that provided social services; it 
was no longer allowed to pursue a political agenda nor practice activities of a political nature. This 
new state of affairs resulted in the expulsion of many feminists from public life. Some were able to 
withdraw quietly and refocus their attention to apolitical public service; others paid a high price for 
their independence. Doria Shafik, for example, paid a heavy price for publicly objecting to the 
dictatorial nature of the new political order. In 1957, she went on a hunger strike at the Indian 
embassy in Cairo to protest against what she described as the dictatorial direction of the Nasser 
regime.  She was banned from public life and put under house arrest. Her life ended tragically with 
suicide (Shafik 2014).  However there are three important points to remember:  (1) many feminists 
seized the opportunities opening up for women to rise and pursue successful careers that at a later 
stage, when the political sphere opened up slightly, were able to return to public life armed with 
expertise and authority they gained over the years; (2) other feminists worked within state structures 
and accommodated the political restrictions; and (3) all the achievements of state feminism are based 
on the work of independent feminists, their demands, their programs, and their ideas. 
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From the 1990s to the first decade of the twenty-first century, state feminism went through a 
new phase, a type of mutation manifested in the establishment of National Councils for Women 
headed by the “First Ladies.” These new structures came in response to new international 
developments regarding the role of governments in supporting women’s rights agendas as well as local 
developments in policy and political ideology. In the next section, I examine the conditions that led to 
these formations. 
 
 
The Internationalization of Women’s Rights 
 
The historical roots of the internationalization of women’s rights extends back to 1975 when the 
General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) declared 1975 as the “International Women’s Year.”  
The First World Conference of Women in Mexico City was held in that same year and 1976-1985 was 
announced as the UN Decade for Women.  The UN also dedicated a voluntary fund to support this 
declaration. In 1979, The General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The Second World Conference on Women held in 
Nairobi in 1985 was described by many as “the birth of global feminism”(United Nations 2019) as it 
situated women’s rights agendas at the center of world politics. The Beijing Platform for Action 
adopted in 1995 at the Fourth World Conference on Women declared women’s rights as human rights, 
and more importantly, committed states to specific actions to guarantee their compliance with the 
agreed resolutions. The strategic objective H.1.b in the Beijing Platform for Action, committed 
governments to create a national machinery, where it does not exist, and strengthen, as appropriate, 
existing national machineries, for the advancement of women at the highest possible level of 
government; it should have clearly defined mandates and authority; critical elements would be 
adequate resources and the ability and competence to influence policy and formulate and review 
legislation; and among other things, it should perform policy analysis, undertake advocacy, 
communication, coordination and monitoring of implementation (United Nations 1995). The 
formation of National Councils of Women, or other forms of national machineries to promote 
women’s rights in the Arab world, happened against the background of these global trends in 
international politics. While the scene in the Arab world is diverse, one common feature has been that 
these international organizations were headed by First Ladies, princesses, or prominent members of 
the ruling elite.  
There is a vast amount of scholarship assessing the impact of the role of the UN and the 
internationalization of women’s rights on women’s movements all over the world. Elisabeth Friedman 
(1999) distinguishes between the term “internationalism” and “transnationalism.” According to 
Friedman, internationalism “particularly addresses the interaction between states, often to the 
exclusion of non-state actors” (359). Transnationalism on the other hand is used to characterize 
regular activity crossing national borders that involves non-state actors (Risse-Kappen 1995, 3; 
quoted in ibid., 359).  A question arises: to what extent has this development (i.e. making women’s 
rights issues an important component in international politics or interstate relations) been good for 
women? This question remains a matter of contention and much debate.   
Sylvia Walby (2002) argues that the integration of feminism in the international discourse of 
human rights, with the emphasis on the responsibilities of states to protect those rights as a 
prerequisite for inclusion in the international regime of “civilized states,” led to positive measures 
undertaken by states in support of women’s rights agendas. Walby foregrounds how feminists world-
wide used this development to lobby their governments.  She says that in this international regime, 
“the nation-state has been the subject of a successful pincer movement by feminists organized at both 
grassroots and trans-national levels” (550).   Feminist researchers also shed light on how participation 
in these high profile UN conferences helped them legitimize their demands and mobilize resources 
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and strengthen local women’s movements (Friedman 1999).  On the other hand, feminists note the 
complex and mixed effects of the internationalization of women’s rights and have also drawn attention 
to potential negative consequences, namely the manipulation of international mechanisms by political 
leaders with detrimental effects on women’s movements, the unequal distribution of resources and 
social capital, and the divisive effect of negative perceptions of foreign funding in local contexts 
(Alvarez 2000). 
How do these debates play out in the Arab world? It is noteworthy that Egypt and Tunisia 
were amongst the countries that proposed the UN dedicate a year to the discussion of women’s rights 
agendas in the international arena. This opportunity was seized by women rights activists who 
participated in international conferences, joined international networks, and consolidated 
transnational alliances. International forums and meetings also became platforms for lobbying 
governments in the Arab world.  Examining processes of political change in Egypt, Mona El-Ghobashy 
(2008) argues that the internationalization of the political regime in Egypt since the mid-1990s was a 
key factor that afforded “activists and ordinary citizens unexpected political leverage in their 
asymmetric share of public power with the executive” (1593). El-Ghobashy points out that despite the 
absence of democratic governance, the Egyptian state was a signatory to human rights conventions 
and bilateral treaties, which imposed international legal commitments. She furthers that integration 
in the international standard setting regime created a space for rights activists to use the concept of 
the rule of law to contest state violations of rights.  
In addition to committing to international conventions, Egypt invested in being recognized as 
an important player on the international scene and a modern nation worthy of a seat in the  “global 
club of civilized countries.” One of the persistent tropes in Egyptian mainstream media has been the 
necessity of safeguarding the “image of Egypt,” which is a narrative about an imagined civilized and 
modern state who is an important player in international politics. Hence, the internationalization of 
Egyptian politics plus the projected self-image of a modern state afforded rights activists 
disproportionate powers vis-a-vis state representatives in international forums as they invoked the 
standards of the rule of law to challenge violations and argue for rights. I argue elsewhere that this 
imagined role of Egypt as a key player in international politics and membership in the international 
club of civilized nations was a key factor in the negotiations over Article 11, or the “women’s article” in 
the Egyptian constitution endorsed in 2014, and was acknowledged by many feminists as a positive 
step forward in enabling a women’s rights agenda (Elsadda 2015).   
There are important stories yet to be told and documented about how feminists have made 
use of international forums to further their agendas in local settings. One such story took place in 
1985, right before the Nairobi conference. In May 1985, the Supreme Constitutional Court in Egypt 
ruled that Law 44/1979 (Jihan Law) was unconstitutional on procedural grounds. The Jihan Law 
introduced some basic amendments to the PSL that regulated polygamy, facilitated women obtaining 
divorce subsequent to a husband’s taking another wife, and most importantly provided protection for 
divorced women who had custody of the children by giving them the right to occupy the marital house 
for the period of custody. In a country with a major housing problem, this was a very important 
measure to protect women and young children from the adverse effects of divorce. The Jihan Law 
indeed was unconstitutional because of the circumstances of its approval in parliament.3 However, it 
was directly linked to the President’s wife’s influence and a manifestation of a state feminism that had 
become extremely unpopular and vulnerable to opposition. Yet, the substance of the Law was aligned 
with the demands of women rights activists and addressed inequitable legal issues that had an adverse 
impact on women’s daily lives and women rights activists saw the annulment of the Jihan Law as a 
setback to women’s rights.  
With the possibility of annulment, women rights activists formed the Committee for the 
Protection of the Family and Women to lobby parliament to endorse the Jihan Law and avert 
annulment. The Committee first met in the Association of Hoda Shaarawi, which was chosen for its 
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historical and symbolic value. The Committee made an effort to mobilize women by announcing times 
and dates of meetings in newspapers and by publishing the committee members’ demands and 
advocacy articles in newspapers and magazines. However, the committee was subjected to a 
vilification campaign by conservatives and was not always successful in finding locations for large 
meetings and members had to organize meetings in houses. Notwithstanding, the efforts of the 
committee were relatively successful: Law 100 of 1985 was passed with very similar articles to Law 44 
that was annulled, but with a compromise to appease conservatives.4 The point to note here is the 
Women’s Conference in Nairobi (1985) was the main reason for expediting the process of the 
(previously) annulled Law 44 going back to parliament to be passed in record time. The annulment 
would have been a sign of a lack of commitment on the part of the state to furthering women’s rights 
agendas and a possible embarrassment on the international stage.  
Going back to the National Councils of Women (NCW) in Arab states, they soon become the 
twenty-first century mutation of state feminism.  Theoretically per UN directives, states are required 
to ensure the autonomy of national machineries by providing the necessary resources and legal 
structures. In authoritarian postcolonial states’ practice, these bodies gradually became arms of state 
manipulation over women’s rights issues. Because most of these councils were headed by First Ladies, 
they were intolerant of dissenting voices and were exclusionary rather than inclusionary. In Egypt, it 
gradually became clear that the primary goal of the NCW was to nationalize women’s rights agendas, 
making it the prerogative of council members to act as the sole representatives of women’s rights 
issues in local and international forums.  
How did feminists interact with NCWs? Again, we find ourselves in a very varied and complex 
scene. Bearing in mind the already existing diversity in ideological and political positions amongst 
feminists, we can discern a wide spectrum of positions and interactions ranging from a radical 
standpoint that rejected cooperation under any circumstance to the other end of the spectrum that 
focused on accommodation. Between these two positions, are forms of interaction based on 
assessments of the political context at any given moment, appraisals of potential losses and gains, and 
decisions to cooperate based on campaign or project issues. It is these stories that need to be 
documented and written.  
In the years since 2011, the NCW in Egypt became a site of contestation not just between 
feminists and the state, but also between state institutions due to interstate divisions, power struggles, 
and the rise of Islamist parties and their entrance into formal politics. While I will mention some key 
features very briefly for the purpose of shedding light on how feminists interact with the state, this is 
another story that remains to be written. In March 2011, feminist organizations came together and 
formed the Coalition of Egyptian Feminist Organizations (CFO). The main aim was to ensure that the 
voice of feminists was heard and noted by revolutionary groups and state actors. One of the tasks 
undertaken by the CFO was the reformation and restructuring of the NCW to make it more 
autonomous (independent of state control), in harmony with independent feminist organizations, and 
effective in pursuing and implementing gender sensitive policies within state institutions. Meetings 
were held with state actors and a proposal was submitted to the cabinet. It was a moment when CFO 
meetings with the cabinet to lobby for the reformation was possible because the political sphere was 
open and accommodating to dissenting voices, which enabled the CFO to voice their views in the 
media and wider audiences.  
However, these efforts to reform were stalled and did not materialize. In the second half of 
2012, the NCW became a target for attack by the new Islamist political elite and efforts were made to 
take over the institution with the view of Islamizing it. A struggle ensued between the then NCW 
members and Islamist state actors. In October 2012, the NCW issued a statement rejecting the 2012 
draft constitution written by a constituent assembly with an Islamist majority (“Egypt’s National 
Council for Women Rejects Constitution Draft”). Under normal circumstances, this dissent of the 
NCW would be unthinkable and must be understood as a concrete example of the divisions and 
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conflicts between state institutions.  At the time, this position was in harmony with the position of 
feminist organizations and the non-Islamist political parties and movements in the country, and was 
consequently welcomed and endorsed. Events, however, took an unfortunate turn on all fronts and 
tensions between independent women’s organizations and the NCW rose in regards to its role of 
becoming the sole representative of women’s issues locally and internationally, as well as its role in 
the nationalization of the women’s movement. 
 
 
Transnational Arab Feminisms 
 
I would like to focus on the distinction made above between “internationalism” and 
“transnationalism,” where transnationalism characterizes non-state actors, women rights groups, and 
independent feminists working together across borders. Long before the UN and the 
internationalization of “rights talk,” Arab women forged alliances with feminists and feminist 
organizations all over the world. Much has been written about Hoda Shaarawi’s participation in the 
ninth Congress of the London-based International Woman Suffrage Alliance (IWSA) held in Rome in 
1923. Also important to remember is that Shaarawi traveled wide and far, or sent delegates from the 
EFU, to meetings and conferences all over the world to make the case for the independence of Egypt, 
confront Zionist claims to Palestine, and establish links with feminists across the world. A trip to 
Berlin introduced Shaarawi to Sarojini Naidu, an Indian feminist who became Governor of Uttar 
Pradesh after independence (Lanfranchi 2012, 176-77). The two women exchanged experiences and 
learned from each other.  
Transnational solidarity between feminists sharing experiences and strategizing together 
continues to be a very important aspect of Arab feminisms.  These transnational encounters have not 
been without challenges and problems due to unequal power relations, colonial legacies, and regional 
and international disputes and rivalries. Nonetheless, it is possible to say that there are strong 
feminist networks and alliances in existence today that have succeeded in addressing and managing 
some of these older challenges. Transnational feminism has also benefited from the 
internationalization of women’s rights because more platforms and opportunities for interaction and 
exchange are made available and possible. 
 
 
Arab Feminists and Islam 
 
The Islamic feminism movement is generally acknowledged to have emerged in the 1980s, gaining 
prominence in the 1990s. However, if we think of Islamic feminism as a form of women’s engagement 
with Islamic heritage, the production of knowledge that empower women, and arguing for rights from 
within an Islamic framework (i.e. one of the approaches undertaken by women to advocate for their 
rights), then we need to go further back in history. Aisha al-Taymuriyya (1840-1902), Malak Hifni 
Nasif (1886-1918), and Nazira Zein Eldin (1908-1976) are all women who engaged with Islamic texts 
and dictums regarding women with the view of challenging patriarchal interpretations that 
undermined women and consolidated male power. Even women who are perceived as representing 
the “secular” feminist movement, such as Hoda Shaarawi, argued for women’s rights from within an 
Islamic frame of reference. In Tunisia, the reform of the Code of Personal Status was conducted with 
recourse to the premise that Islamic texts allow for multiple interpretations and are adaptable to 
changing historical conditions. In other words, the entire reform project was phrased and 
conceptualized from within an Islamic frame of reference. The same can be said regarding the reforms 
of the mudawanna in Morocco in 2004 (Charrad 2012).  
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Islamic feminism is and continues to be a highly contested label, as many of its key advocates 
and practitioners distance themselves from the label, problematize it, or qualify it. It has changed its 
meaning over the years and has many definitions and manifestations, almost as many as the women 
who engage with it. In her earlier work, Ziba Mir-Hosseini (2011) links the beginnings of the Islamic 
feminist movement with the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran in 1979. Mir-Hosseini uses 
the term “Islamic feminist” to describe the “Islamist Iranian women who after the 1979 revolution 
played a crucial role in silencing other women’s voices” (4), meaning she identified Islamic feminists 
as supporters of Islamist agendas. In a later phase, she makes a distinction between “Islamic 
feminists” and “Islamist women,” arguing that Islamic feminists do not necessarily subscribe to 
political Islam, and more importantly, engage critically with Islamic texts and Islamist movements.  
Such engagement culminates in the Musawah movement in which Hosseini herself is a key member 
(ibid.).  Further, Omaima Abou Bakr (2013), a prominent Egyptian Islamic feminist, defines the 
Islamic feminist movement as an intellectual and activist project that focuses on “the production of 
gender-sensitive knowledge within an Islamic frame of reference,” adding that “[b]esides critiquing 
patriarchal discrimination [in male mainstream jurisprudence], the ultimate aim is reform and 
reconstruction (3). It is this Islamic feminist knowledge production project that is now recognized as 
characteristic of the movement. 
In the 1980s, women’s groups in Egypt were self-identified as secular. A more accurate term I 
suggest would be non-Islamist due to the many meanings and connotations of “secular” in the 
Egyptian context.5 In preparation for the 1993 International Conference on Population and 
Development (ICPD), the issue of how to frame women’s rights agenda (i.e. using a universal rights 
approach versus a rights approach compatible with Islam) was the subject of heated discussions 
amongst feminists. The consensus at the end was in favor of arguing for rights from within an 
Islamic/cultural framework. This was particularly the case with the task force that worked on 
proposing amendments to marriage and divorce laws in Egypt, a campaign that eventually led to 
passing Law 1 in 2000, which made it possible for women to obtain a no-fault divorce (khul’) and 
introduced a new template for marriage contracts with an appendix listing possible conditions to be 
inserted in the contract. The aim of Law 1 was primarily consciousness-raising.  The ICPD, which 
convened in Egypt, was an important milestone in the history of the women’s movement in Egypt 
because it enabled public debates on gender rights, pushed rights agendas, and encouraged the 
formation of feminist groups. The overall experience, particularly the direct and confrontational 
encounters with Islamists in the NGO forum, convinced many feminist groups to rethink their 
positions vis-a-vis ignoring or disregarding the culturalist and Islamist discourses in their activism.  
Hence, framing women’s rights agendas with reference to values and concepts in Islam has 
been a key strategy undertaken by women rights activists in their battle for rights. I argue the picture 
is blurred or distorted due to the large variations in the usage, meanings, and connotations of the 
terms feminism, Islam, and religion, as well as the conflicting, even adversarial, ideological positions 
pitting secular feminism versus Islamic feminism. Importantly, Mir Hosseini (2011) notes the rancor 
and anger often exhibited by radical voices from both camps vis-a-vis one another, despite the fluidity 
and transformations in the positions of many feminists’ responses to historical changes. Mir-
Hosseini’s feminist views regarding the relations, tensions, and dynamics between feminism and 
religion have developed and changed along the years.  Her more recent position calls for “a 
reconciliation and transcendence of the distinction” between secular feminism and Islamic feminism 
(ibid., 11). 
 If one of the arguments for the importance of Islamic feminists in Arab societies has been that 
their references to Islamic values and concepts enable them to address larger audiences in their 
societies and legitimizing their work by virtue of its closeness to Arab cultures and values, then how 
effective has this approach been? This is a difficult question to answer, particularly as I have 
persistently blurred the boundaries between Islamic feminists and secular feminists. In certain 
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contexts, resorting to religious justifications often is very useful and is a strategy adopted by a 
diversity of feminists.   However, when an Islamic feminist in Egypt challenges the core of patriarchal 
discrimination with solid scholarship and iron-clad arguments, she will be met with maximum 
aggression and may be dismissed or denied access to public platforms. History has shown that 
producing feminist theological knowledge is one thing, but having the authority and the power to 
disseminate this knowledge and be accepted by the mainstream is another. Similar to secular 
feminists, Islamic feminists are not looked upon favorably by orthodox and conservative religious 
establishments; they too are regarded with suspicion by authoritarian postcolonial states, who have 
consistently sought to manipulate the power of religion to their own ends. Like secular feminists, 
Islamic feminists are entangled in the complex circle of state, religion, and dictatorship. 
 
 
Concluding Reflections 
 
I have attempted a brief survey of my experience with how feminists in Egypt have made use of the 
political opportunities presented to them.  Important to this process is how they negotiated, 
accommodated, or confronted power by taking into consideration multiple key trends in the history of 
Arab feminisms. My aim has been threefold: (1) to highlight the variety and richness in direction and 
activism; (2) to invite a revision of some dominant stereotypical narratives about feminist activism 
that undermine much that was achieved; and (3) to shed light on an important variable that often gets 
lost in accounts, which includes how Arab feminists practiced and advocated for their rights in 
authoritarian contexts that are not by definition genuine supporters of rights and freedoms. In other 
words, Arab feminists, in their struggle for gender justice, did not only confront patriarchal prejudice 
and discrimination, but they did so in undemocratic authoritarian settings that are inimical to all 
forms of collective organizing and action.  
In the aftermath of the wave of Arab revolutions in 2011, feminists in Egypt seized the 
opportunities that were presented to them consequent to the opening up of political spaces for 
mobilization and activism on the ground. They formed a feminist coalition; partnered with broader 
coalitions; joined new political parties and various initiatives; organized campaigns; organized and 
participated in street demonstrations; participated in negotiations with official bodies and state actors 
over legal reform and constitutional reform; lobbied members of parliament; and led media 
campaigns to raise consciousness regarding gender justice. Now, with the vilification campaign 
against rights groups and the closing down of political spaces that marks the current moment in 
Egypt, it is easy, and very common, to hear voices that question the ability of feminists to attain the 
goal of gender justice. Despite the fact that right now the light at the end of the tunnel is difficult to 
see, it is important to remember that gains have been achieved. There is consensus amongst feminists 
in Egypt that one of the revolutionary gains has been the breaking of the taboo about sexual violence. 
A law has passed criminalizing harassment, anti-sexual harassment units have been established in 
police stations, and the issue is no longer treated as a taboo but as a social challenge that must be 
addressed. Tunisia, the jewel of the crown in Arab revolutions, passed one of the most progressive 
anti-violence against women laws in the world.6 
The history of Arab feminisms is a history of appropriation, manipulation, and negotiation 
with power in authoritarian postcolonial states. Arab feminisms, however, are not in crisis, as has 
been suggested in some forums, but are constantly operating in crisis mode, the modus operandi of 
feminists living under dictatorships. We have accumulated a lot of experience and skills in confronting 
challenges, accommodating setbacks, and surviving against all odds. To answer the question what can 
feminism accomplish, we must first acknowledge and recognize what feminism has accomplished, and 
under what circumstances. Understanding the past is a prerequisite for charting the future. And our 
past is, understandably, strewn with numerous losses and gains, achievements and setbacks, and 
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success and frustration. There is significant scholarship that documents women’s movements in the 
Arab world, yet much remains unsaid and unwritten. These are the little fragments, the differentiated 
stories of state and non-state actors in local, regional, and international settings.  Who said what and 
why? Why was one meeting successful? What made an international solidarity campaign successful, 
while another one failed? I make a case for the necessity of remembering, preserving our memory, 
both short term and long term memory.  All things considered much has been achieved. I argue that 
feminism has been one of the most successful social movements in the Arab world, if not the most 
successful. 
             
 
Notes 
 
1. This article is adapted from a keynote address delivered at a conference at the American University in 
Beirut, “Feminism in Crisis? Gender and the Arab Public Sphere,” on 19-20 January 2018. 
 
2. A good example is Shibly Shimayyal, a reformist and medical doctor, who introduced social 
Darwinism to the Arab cultural scene through his translation of Buchner’s commentary on Darwin. There was a 
fascinating exchange in the year 1886 between women writers and Shimayyil, as they challenged his views. He 
used pseudo scientific arguments that were popular in the 19th century to argue for the superiority of men over 
women and for undermining women’s demands for suffrage and freedom (Shimayyil 1886).     
 
3. The Jihan Law was passed by presidential decree during the period of recess of parliament and was 
not subsequently presented to parliament for endorsement as per constitutional mandate. In addition, the Law 
was not of an urgent nature, which would have allowed the President to use his exceptional power to pass a law 
during parliament recess period. Strictly speaking, it was unconstitutional. 
 
4. While Law 44 allowed a wife to divorce her husband should he marry another wife without proving 
harm, which meant that marrying another wife was acknowledged as harm that did not need further proof. Law 
100 stated that a wife had to prove harm related to her husband’s second marriage. 
 
5. Nadje al-Ali has an important intervention in the use and connotations of the term secular in Egypt 
(al-Ali 2000). 
 
6. For details about the anti-sexual harassment movement in Egypt post-2011 see Elsadda 2018 and 
Tadros 2016. 
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